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Abstract:
This paper discusses the results from general equilibrium trade models executed towards
the end of the Uruguay Round, reporting both aggregate and regional gains. These results were
generated some 5 years ago, and were important to the debates at the end of the Uruguay Round
as to what would be the foregone gains were the Round not to conclude. The paper argues that
there are substantial, and at times hard to explain inconsistencies across model results.  One
model shows most of the gains come from agricultural liberalization, another from textiles, and
yet another from tariff cuts.  One model shows developing countries account for around 10% of
the total gain, another shows them to gain over 50%.  One model shows developing countries
losing from elimination of the MFA, another shows them as large gainers.  One model shows
that imperfectly competitive and sc le economy effects double global gains, another shows
almost no impact.  These differences occur even where similar data sets, and benchmark years
are used, and are hard to explain on the basis of parametric specifications for models seemingly
used though these are frequently poorly exposited.  The paper also discusses the verification of
models relative to behaviour since the Round concluded, expressing skepticism as to its
feasibility for reasons set out in the paper.  It also attempts to discuss what, if any, are the
implications for the developing countries, and the possible ways forward in making these models
more useable in the Millennium Round.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the period overlapping with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round (say, between 1993 and
1996), at least eight global multi-commodity multi-region equilibrium models (by my count) were
constructed to analyze the potential impacts of the Round.  Such models had been built on a smaller
scale during the Tokyo Round, but this represented a major enlargement of previous activity of this
type.  New (and large) model admissible data sets were assembled; the major institutional players
(the WTO (GATT), the World Bank, and the OECD) all housed and supported in various ways one
or more of these modelling efforts and with enhanced computing power and software, models were
in place that could be quickly solved and resolved for sensitivity and other analyses.
This piece looks back at these efforts with a new Round still under discussion after Seattle,
and asks what developing country negotiators can infer from the results from the models by way of
pointers for their negotiating positions for a new Round.  The conclusion is that at first sight, the
picture is one of substantial confusion.  Some model results suggest that the gains to developing
countries from the Uruguay Round might have been only small (say 10% of the total global gain)
while some have them as much larger (over 60% of the total).  One can also find model results that
seemingly indicate that developing countries either lost from an elimination of the MFA or gained
a lot; that the largest sources of gain in the Uruguay Round lay in agriculture, in textiles, or even in
tariff cuts.  One can become further confused by seeing model results that suggested that, potentially,
liberalization in services could dominate everything else in the Round; or results that suggest only
small impacts from services.
If this is not enough, one can get into more technical aspects of the modeling work and find
results showing that introducing scale economies and market structure considerations into models
doubles the gains, and counter claims and results that they will not.  One can read discussions of
2sensitivity analyses showing that model results are robust to significant variations in elasticities, and
other discussion of how results are, in fact, substantially elasticity dependent.  And if one cares to
descend into results reported for individual countries and regions, one can find changes of sign and
size across models and regions for particular results, and claimed positive country impacts as large
as 20% of GDP.  If as a developing country negotiator, one wanted to draw upon the model results
to support or help frame a negotiating position for the Millennium Round, seemingly there is support
for almost anything one wanted to argue.  The gains to developing countries could be large or small;
agriculture could be the most important issue, or it could be services.  Impacts on individual
countries could positive or negative, large or small.
These may strike negotiators as somewhat strange and overly negative conclusions to draw
from this modeling work.  Quantification of trade policy impacts is usually thought of as good and
bringing important factual material to bear on policy.  If model results differ in some way, surely
they must be able to be reconciled, and we can see what the differences in model design and
execution are that account for them.  Data, model parameter values, estimates of trade distortions,
and theoretical structures are the ones that come most readily to mind.  And given that the models
were built some five years ago, equally surely with hindsight and data generated since the Round we
should be able to readily see which model predictions were right and which were wrong.
Some of the modelers have made (often heroic) efforts to reconcile their results with others,
and these help a little in sorting things out.  But at the same time, it is unfortunately the case that the
differences I list above remain as largely unreconciled and hence a source of confusion for possible
Millennium Round negotiators.  Also, Uruguay Round model predictions are difficult to verify
expost from 2000 for a number of reasons.  Key predictions relate to things not directly measured
3(like welfare); the decisions of the Uruguay Round remain (in 1999) only partially implemented, in
contrast to the full implementation assumed in the models; and all manner of developments outside
the Uruguay Round decisions have influenced the actual behaviour of the global economy (and
probably more so that the Round’s decisions).
In the paper I first describe key differences in model results, and ask what can account for
them.  I also speculate why these differences have remained so relatively unnoticed for so long, and
what this implies for how model results are used more widely in the policy process.  I then discuss
what all of this may mean both for the formulation of negotiating positions in the new Round, and
for any associated new modeling efforts parallel to it.  Specifically, I ask how modellers might be
able to work more effectively together so as to improve the value of their joint work for negotiators.
42. DIFFERENCES IN RESULTS FROM URUGUAY ROUND MODELS
For the purposes of the present discussion I will focus on 8 models, each of which sought in
various ways to analyze the impacts of the Uruguay Round during the early - mid 1990's.  Their
focus was on welfare impacts, trade flows, production and consumption; both in aggregate and
individually for key regions and economies. The early versions of these models looked prospectively
at what a package of liberalization in the Round might be, along with its implications; the later
models sought to analyze the impacts of the actual package which resulted as negotiations concluded.
The focus of modeling was on those elements which more easily lent themselves to quantification
(tariff cuts, agriculture, textiles) rather than hard to quantify elements (dispute settlement, TRIMs,
TRIPs).  Some of the more difficult to model elements, such as services, received partial
quantification.  I discuss both the model results and the underlying structures and data used, stressing
a comparative approach and emphasizing the results giving estimated impacts on the developing
countries.
The 8 models at issue are all numerical general equilibrium models.  I view them as fairly
conventional in structure relative to previous literature, and in the spirit of Hecksher-Ohlin models
which dominated trade theory from the 1940's until the mid 1970's, with the key difference being the
incorporation of product heterogeneity across countries (the Armington treatment).  They treat the
global economy as a series of regions (or countries), each of which have demands and supplies for
a series of country specific goods, and engage in international trade. Demands reflect utility
maximizing behaviour, typically by an assumed representative consumer for each region.  Supplies
reflect the outcome of sectoral profit maximizing behaviour in which there are production functions
with inputs (capital and labour) and outputs, as well as intermediate products. Exports are given by
52See the discussion of this in Shoven and Whalley (1992).
sales abroad of country specific goods, and imports as purchases from all other regions.  In such an
Armington structure, all pairwise trade flows of goods between regions are identified.
Trade barriers in the model regions operate against the various traded goods; and they restrict
trade and change trade patterns, demands, and supplies.  Changes in trade barriers, as occurred under
Uruguay Round liberalization, alter trade, consumption and production across regions, and prices
of products across regions adjust to clear markets.  Constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
functional forms are nearly uniformly used in these models. Welfare impacts are evaluated by
comparing regional welfare before and after liberalization, with changes in welfare converted into
an equivalent monetary measures (so called money metric welfare measures).2
A few further points should be noted about these models.  One is that they typically assume
perfect competition and constant returns to scale, although in some cases model variants embodying
increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition are used (there is disagreement among
modelers as to how important this is for results).  Another is that models are typically single period,
although some use various multiplier devices to adjust results for what they call dynamic effects.
These adjustments can more than double the estimated impacts of Uruguay Round liberalization in
some models.
Another is that these models are typically benchmarked, or calibrated, to a base year data set,
around which counterfactual experiments are conducted to simulate the effects of Uruguay Round
liberalization.  Many of the models draw on a data compilation for 1992, known as the GTAP data
set.  This data compilation, initiated by Tom Hertel of Perdue University, draws together data on
trade, consumption, production and trade barriers for each of a number of countries and regions.
63Two of the original working papers, one by Yang (1994), and the first Francois,
MacDonald and Nordström paper (FNM (1993)) are unpublished and not accessible through the
library facilities available to me.  I have relied on the secondary descriptions of these in Perroni
(1998) and Francois, MacDonald, and Nordström (1996)).  I have also assumed FNM (1993) to
be close to FNM (1994).
4I have excluded other models, such as the partial equilibrium model of Page and
Davenport (1994), since the structures are different from those in the general equilibrium models.
5Two earlier survey pieces on Uruguay Round models provide helpful details on model
structures, data, and results across models (Perroni (1998), and Francois, McDonald, and
Nordström (1996a)) and I draw on these here.  These surveys results lay out model results in a
matter of fact way, with less commentary than offered here across model results.
Since its initiation in the early 1990's, it has grown substantially in product and regional coverage.
One of the strengths of the Uruguay Round modeling efforts has been both the assembly and
availability of data in this form.  This largely common use of data (along with the equally common
use of CES functions), other things being equal, should also make the model results more similar
than otherwise.  Typical levels of disaggregation in models are 10-20 commodities, and 10 or so
regions.
The models3 I have chosen4 for this exercise5 are
1. Francois, McDonald, and Nordström (1993,1994) [FMN1] This is an early 10 sector, 7
region general equilibrium model which when used in increasing returns to scale,
monopolistic competition format, and with added accumulation effects, produced a $510
billion global gain estimate for the Uruguay Round decisions.  This was the basis for $500
billion figure subsequently repeatedly cited by Peter Sutherland, the then Director General
of GATT.  It was benchmarked to 1990 data, and was used in a range of formats (constant
returns/increasing returns; with and without steady state analysis) producing a range of
estimates of global gains from less than $100 billion to the $510 billion estimate.  It captured
7a global liberalization package including MFA removal, tariff cuts on industrial goods,
agricultural liberalization, and NTB removal.  The $510 billion of gains involved a
projection out to 2005 with assumed interim growth rates for the global economy, although
the gains were still measured in 1992 prices.  Liberalization of services, TRIPs, TRIMs and
other elements of the Uruguay Round liberalization package (such as dispute settlement)
were excluded.
2. Francois, McDonald, and Nordström (1995, 1996a) [FMN2].  These are later versions of the
original FMN1 model of 1993, which expanded on the number of sectors and regions (up to
19 and 12 respectively).  Later versions analyzed actual agreed to liberalization from the
Round, rather than the conjectural liberalization packages of earlier.  Various projections
over time of estimated gains were produced.  The basic model structures remained the same
as in the earlier piece, but the estimates of size of gains fell significantly; typically from $510
billion annually in the 1993 and 1994 papers to the $40 - $215 billion range.
3. Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1995, 1996, 1997) [HRT].  These 3 related papers report
results of Uruguay Round liberalization from a 22 sector, 11 region global general
equilibrium model calibrated to 1992 data and projected forward to 2005.  The liberalization
covered MFA removal, agricultural liberalization, and tariff cuts.  They produced annual
static welfare gains of $96 billion in 1992 dollars, with an upper bound steady state
increasing returns to scale estimate of $171 billion.  Their results showed developing country
losses from MFA removal (due to reduced rent transfers), and little difference in results with
and without market structure/scale economy features, although their steady state
modifications do significantly affect results.
86HMYD project forward to 2005 taking into account differential rates of growth in capital,
labour, and human capital, as well as productivity growth by country so as to match World Bank
GDP projections.  In most developing countries, these projections increase capital in
manufacturing relative to labour.  Projections for export tax equivalents of MFA quotas also
increase under these projections, leading to a greater role for industrial tariffs.  I am grateful to
Will Martin for bringing these points to my attention.
4. Goldin, Knudsen (1995 only) and van der Mensbrugghe (1993, 1995) [GM]. This is a 22
region, 20 sector model with an urban rural structure and endogenous employment in regions
(in some model variants).  Benchmarked to 1985-93 data, the model considers changes in
NTB equivalents due to Uruguay Round liberalization.  In its 1995 version, projected annual
gains out to 2002 were $235 billion, while in its 1993 version the annual gains were
projected to be $511 billion (also in 2002).
5. Hertel, Martin, Yangashima, and Dimaranan (1995, 1996) [HMYD].  This is a constant
returns to scale, perfectly competitive model, covering 15 regions and 10 sectors.  It
considers Uruguay Round cuts in industrial tariffs, agricultural liberalization, and MFA
elimination, showing global gains of $258 billion in 1992 prices by the year 2005.  A feature
of this model is the seemingly more prominent role for industrial tariff cuts in model results
compared to other models.6
6. Yang (1994).  This is similar in structure to HMYD, also using 1992 data for its benchmark
year.  It examines cuts in industrial tariffs, agricultural liberalization, and MFA removal, and
examines various model variants, including with external scale economies.  It concludes that
annual global gains from the Uruguay Round lie in a range of $69-146 billion based on 1992
data, with no forward projection of gains.
97. Nguyen, Perroni, and Wigle (1991, 1993, 1995) [NPW].  This is again similar in structure
to HMYD and also to Yang, covering 9 sectors and 10 regions, but is based on a data set
separately assembled by the authors for 1986.  They also consider industrial tariffs, textiles
and clothing, and agriculture; but add to this liberalization of services.  They show annual
global gains from global liberalization thought at the time of their 1993 paper to reflect the
likely Uruguay Round decisions of $212 billion in 1986 dollars; but this estimate is revised
downward to $69 billion in their 1995 paper evaluating the actual agreement.
8. Brown, Deardorff, Fox and Stern (1995) [BFDS].  This piece deals with liberalization of
trade in both services and industrial products in the Round using a 29 sector, 8 region model
using 1990 base case data, and embodying product differentiation and monopolistic
competition.  The paper begins by suggesting that little liberalization was actually achieved
in services in the Round, and argues that its main contribution is to quantify what the benefits
of services liberalization could be when they eventually occur.  They seem to show gains
from services liberalization significantly larger than Uruguay Round liberalization in goods
in their tables, but their text appears to indicate a less significant role for services.
The findings from these models were important both in the period leading up to the
conclusion of the Round in April 1994 and subsequently, in evaluating the impacts of both
prospective and actual Uruguay Round decisions.  The main focus in the initial discussion of model
results was the aggregate size of gains; whether they were really as large as had been claimed in the
early work (some $500 bill.) and projected by Peter Sutherland.  The details in the results were less
fully discussed, in part because the political process did not seem to focus on them.
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7Prior to this work the GATT was not known as an agency with particular expertise in the
modelling area.  There is little of a peer review process being used to evaluate these results, prior
to Sutherland using them in 1993 to underscore his arguments in favour of concluding the
Round.
In evaluating these results, my approach here is to take their results as a combined set, and
ask what negotiators can conclude from them today, relevant to their concerns.  The focus is on the
outputs (results) from the modeling work, more so than on the inputs (data, model structure)
emphasizing three groups of results; (a) the size of aggregate gains to the global economy from
Uruguay Round liberalization (b) similarities and differences by region, country and area of
liberalization (tariffs, agriculture, textiles) using more detailed results, and (c) the seeming
implications of these model results for the developing countries and their possible positions in a
Millennium Round. FMN (1996a), and Perroni (1998) in discussing these models provide helpful
comparative material, on which I draw, but they tend to focus more on differences in model structure
and data, and offer relatively little commentary on results, instead largely simply setting them out
in tabular form.
Global Gains From The Uruguay Round
How large the aggregate gains to the global economy from Uruguay Round liberalization
could be became a topic of intense discussion when Peter Sutherland, then Director General of
GATT in the closing stages of the Round, picked up on early model studies of the impacts of the
Round executed at the WTO (then GATT).7  His portrayal of gains in the region of $500 billion per
year; and his emphasis on the lost opportunity if the Round were not concluded proved central
11
8For instance, a later October 5th 1994 story in the Times “Sutherland confident WTO is
on schedule” states “GATT’s secretariat has calculated the impact of enhanced international
competition and economies of scale associated with access to wider markets.  They suggest
global income in 2005 would be more than a further $500 billion higher than it would have been
without the Uruguay Round”.
A related story in the Journal of Commerce around the same time quotes Sutherland as
saying that “the GATT is preparing to release............updated figures on the worldwide economic
benefits that will accrue as a result of the Round’s completion.  Previous studies had estimated a
$200 billion annual boost to global economic output resulting from the deal............Sutherland
said that by products of the accord, including enhanced competition and the economies of scale
enabling producers to spread fixed costs over larger export markets would produce far greater
benefits than had previously been calculated.........(the) study showed the benefits to increase to
more than $500 bill. in 2005".
9The impacts on African economies, and also on net food importing countries who
believed they lost from a reduction in agricultural supports in food exporting countries, were
subsequently to become a subject of further debate.
factors in persuading then GATT contracting parties to successfully conclude the Round in 1994.8
It was also widely believed at this time that model results showed gains from the Round for nearly
all countries, including most developing countries.9
In assessing aggregate estimates of gain such as these, it helps first to clarify a few points.
First, modelers measure gains in terms of welfare, or real income; not in terms of GDP.  A number
of elements of improved economic performance from trade liberalization are captured in such a
measure, but not all relate to the production side of the economy.  Consumer benefits accrue from
lowered domestic prices as trade barriers fall.  Improvements in resource allocation within
economies occur as internationally distorting policies are removed.  Improved access to a wider
variety of products as trade increases is a factor in market structure models, as is increased
specialization in production which occurs as trade expands and benefits of economies of scale are
realized. All these elements show up as part of the global gains from Uruguay Round trade
liberalization.
12
10The issue of the direct measurability of welfare is a longstanding issue in economic
research, which has never been adequately resolved.  Irving Fisher argued that welfare change
was measurable if there was a commodity with constant marginal utility (he thought this was
food).  Edgeworth proposed directly applying measuring devices for utility to human subjects. 
But in the data available from Statistical Offices around the world on trade patterns, production
and consumption, welfare remains not directly measured, and inferring welfare changes from
revealed behaviour depends on the parameters of the model of behaviour used.
However, country gains need not, and typically will not, follow this pattern.  As export
subsidies are removed in various countries, importers elsewhere may suffer.  As commodity prices
rise, exporters of these commodities gain and importers lose. The global gain only reflects the
aggregate effect and country gains and losses will criss cross country borders.  It is also important
to flag that these welfare gains are also not directly measurable.  Available data show changes in
production, consumption, trade, and other value based measures of economic activity.  Welfare is
not directly measured since it is not directly observable.10  This is a major difficulty with any expost
validation of model predictions of gain or loss.
Table 1 reports estimates of global gains produced by the model studies referred to above.
Its striking feature is the sharp difference between the results of the early and later studies.  Gains
from the early studies are, in 2 cases, over $500 billion/year (the estimate repeatedly cited by Peter
Sutherland).  Later estimates are considerably lower and with some variation, being in the range of
$40 billion - $258 billion. Table 1 also reports welfare gains as percentage of global income for the
relevant year.  The range is from 0.17% of global product on the low side to 1.36% on the high side.
The early estimates (taking a 1.36% figure for the $510 billion estimate in FMN1) average to perhaps
1.2%; the later estimates to perhaps 0.5or 0.6%.  The range in later estimates from 0.17% to 0.89%
involves a factor of nearly 5.
13
11I am grateful to Will Martin for correcting an earlier draft on this point.
This is one area where results have received substantial comment from the modelers, placing
their own results on aggregate effects in comparison with those of others. In aligning these estimates,
as FMN (1996a) point out, one has to be careful in taking account both of different dollars
(valuations in different year prices) and different time reference points (these vary between 1986 and
2005), and FNM indicate that their evaluation is that when “expressed as percentages of baseline
(status quo) GDP, the numbers are surprisingly comparable” (p.8).  This is not quite the conclusion
suggested by the range in % terms in Table 1 varying by a factor of 5.
HRT (1996, p. 243) highlight the different growth factors involved in producing various
results, and indicate that the FMN1 $510 billion estimate with their extrapolation removed is $291
billion.  They suggest the reduced $193 billion estimate of FMN2 (with increasing returns to scale)
is comparable to the HRT increasing returns to scale estimate of $171 billion.  HRT attribute the
differences between their constant returns estimate ($93 billion) and HMYD ($258 billion) to the
influence of a forward projection to 2005 in HMYD (which doubles the estimate), to lower MFA
quota growth rates in HMYD,11 and to the use of higher elasticities in HMYD.
14
12As FMN (1996b) note, the reported 0.42% for this estimate in HMYD (1995) is in error,
and is not reported in HMYD (1996).
13BDFS report no global estimate directly.  On p.292 in their introduction, they report “the
effects of liberalization in services trade are of the same order of magnitude as for liberalization
in industrial products”, but in their table 10.2 (p.301) which reports welfare effects by region (but
not globally) most of the welfare effect seems accounted for by services rather than goods
liberalization.
Table 1
Estimated Global Gains from the Uruguay Round Decisions
Early Studies Estimated Global Gain in $ Gains as % of GDP
Francois, McDonald,
Nordström (1993, 1994)
$510 billion/year based on 1990 prices and projected to
2005
0.31-1.36%
Goldin, Knudsen, and van
der Mensbrugghe (1993)
$511 billion/year based on 1990 prices and projected to
2002
n.a.
Nguyen, Perroni, and Wigle
(1993)
$212 billion/year based on 1986 data 1.1%
Later Studies
Yang (1994) $69 - $196 billion in 1992 (1992 prices) 0.3-0.63%
Francois, McDonald,
Nordström (1995, 1996b)
$40 billion - $214 billion in 2005 (in 1992 prices) 0.17%-0.44%
Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr
(1995, 1996, 1998)
$96 billion - $171 billion (1992 prices) 0.405%-0.712%
Goldin, Knudsen, and van
der Mensbrugghe (1995)
$235 billion in 2002 (in 1992 prices) n.a.
Hertel, Martin,
Yangashima, and Dimaran
(1996)
$258 billion in 2005 (in 1992 prices) 0.89%12
Brown, Deardorff, Fox, and
Stern (1995)
services liberalization yields gains larger than for
liberalization of goods (no specific global estimate
reported)13
n.a.
Nguyen, Perroni, and Wigle
(1995)
$69 billion/year based on 1986 data
15
14See, in clear contrast, the results reported in the later Table 3 and the discussion around
the table.
HRT conclude (p.243) that “...we do not regard.......differences between our estimates and
the WTO and GTAP teams as significant.  The broad themes....are quite similar across the models.
In particular, all the models indicate that those countries that liberalized the most gained the most;
and this was the European Union, the United States, and Japan”.14  Here again, there is the issue of
whether a range of 5 for estimates as a % of gross world product is significant; but also a statement
that seems to be at odds with some of the results presented for other models elsewhere in the same
volume.  FMN (1996a), for instance, show (Table 9.11, pp. 283-284) that for their increasing returns
to scale cases the majority of gains accrue to non OECD (effectively developing countries), and in
% terms these gains can be as large as 5% of income for economies such as China, while gains do
not exceed 0.5% of GDP for OECD countries.
Most attention was placed on the estimates of aggregate global gain when these results
appeared, since at political level this was the feature of results (and seemingly, the only feature) that
figured prominently in debate.  HRT (1995, 1996, 1998) devoted the most attention to reconciling
the various model estimates to allow for different (or no) extrapolations, differences in model
features, and other factors.  They also offer reconciliations in other areas discussed below, such as
agriculture and textiles, clearly a sensible way to proceed and these modelers deserve credit for
setting out their reconciliations clearly.
The (to me convincing) argument offered by modellers as to why lower estimates of gain
occur in the later studies is that the early studies based themselves on various conjectures as to what
the Uruguay Round liberalization package would look like, and were generally too optimistic about
16
the extent of the actual liberalization which eventually resulted.  This point is emphasized by Perroni
(1998) in his survey of Uruguay Round model results.  Particularly striking is the downward revision
by a factor of 3 in the results between early and later versions of the Perroni, Nguyen, and Wigle
studies.  Perroni attributes all of the revision to reduced estimates of barrier change due to the Round.
Francois (1999) makes a similar argument.  As such, this argues that the use of early and larger
estimates of gain by Peter Sutherland in his advocacy of potentially foregone gains should the Round
not succeed was defensible, since the precise contours of the final package were still unknown at that
point.
Detailed Impacts From The Round
It is, however, when the results from the models listed above are analyzed at a more detailed
level in an attempt to see what can be learned for negotiating positions for developing countries in
a new Round that difficulties arise.  Simply put, there seem to be multiple and significant
inconsistencies across model results.  Somewhat surprisingly, these seem not to have been previously
noted (including by modelers), nor discussed in published papers commenting on the various  model
pieces.
Table 2 reports estimates of the global welfare impacts of liberalization from the component
parts of the Uruguay Round results analyzed in these models (agriculture, tariffs, and textiles and
clothing) for a subset of the models listed in Table 1.  There are striking differences between these
model results.  For instance, HRT show agriculture to be unambiguously the largest area of gain in
their constant 
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Table 2
Estimated Global Gains From Components of
Liberalization in the Uruguay Round Models
displaying such results
Agricultural Reform Industrial Tariffs Textiles and Clothing
(MFA)
1.  FMD2 (1996) CRS 9.34
($bill, 1992 prices)
54.31
($bill, 1992 prices)
35.71
($bill, 1992 prices)
IRS 7.08
($bill, 1992 prices)
84.57
($bill, 1992 prices)
107.68
($bill, 1992 prices)
2.  HRT(1996) CRS 58.6
($bill, 1992 prices)
21.7
($bill, 1992 prices)
16.4
($bill, 1992 prices)
IRS - Steady
State
63.7
($bill, 1992 prices)
86.8
($bill, 1992 prices)
20.3
($bill, 1992 prices)
3.  HMYD (1996) CRS 207.6
($bill, 1992 prices)
50.1
($bill, 1992 prices)
4.  NPW (1995) CRS 36.9
($bill, 1986 prices)
17.0
($bill, 1986 prices)
10.1
($bill, 1986 prices)
returns to scale case.  It remains important, but less dominant, in their increasing returns to scale -
steady state case.  In contrast, FMN2 show agriculture to be of minor importance in both sets of their
results. HRT show textiles to be of relatively minor importance, while in their increasing returns case
FMN2 show it to be the dominant component.  HMYD show tariffs (and seemingly predominantly
industrial tariffs) to be the largest source of gain, a theme missing in NPW, who place most weight
on agriculture.
Table 3 reports results on the regional composition of gains and loss, both by component of
liberalization and in total; again showing large differences in results across models.  Here, I have
taken results only for those models showing this level of detail, and have chosen only one set of
results for each model, even where multiple results are displayed.  Two of these are for increasing
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returns cases (HRT, FMN2) and two for constant returns cases (HMYD and PNW).  In these results,
HRT show gains from agricultural liberalization to the EU of $28.3 billion, while FMN2 show gains
of only $0.5 bill.  HRT show gains to Japan in agriculture of $15.1 billion; FMN2 show losses of 0.2
billion. Impacts on developing countries differ by sign and size; see the startling gains for Malaysia
in the HMYD results, for instance.
Table 3
Model Estimates of Uruguay Round Gains by
Component by Region ($bill)
HRT (IRS) FMN2 (IRS, Fixed
Capital)
HMYD (CRS) PNW (CRS)
Developed
World
Ag Tex Total Ag Tex Total Ag Tex Total Ag Tex Total
US/Canada 2.1 10.9 14.6 -0.02 11.5 17.2 n.a. 29.4 32.2 4.6 0.3 10.8
EU 28.3 7.6 39.3 0.5 10.3 17.1 n.a. 27.5 58.4 12.7 3.5 19.0
Japan 15.1 -0.6 16.9 -0.2 2.0 5.7 n.a. 1.1 43.0 14.5 1.8 19.0
Developing
World
Asia
   China -0.5 1.0 1.3 0.3 9.4 12.4 n.a. 5.3 19.9
-0.6 1.1 0.1
   Malaysia 1.2 0.1 1.8
0.4 15.2 19.7
n.a. -0.6 34.2
   Thailand 0.8 0.1 2.5 n.a. 1.5 10.4
   Indonesia 0.2 0.6 1.3 n.a. 3.0 11.1
Africa -0.2 0.0 -0.3 1.3 0.4 6.2 n.a. -0.7 -1.3
L.America 2.2 -0.1 3.6 1.0 0.07 3.9 n.a. -3.7 -1.3
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15See Tables 8.4 and 8.6 in HRT (1996).
16The intuition behind such a belief is that the majority of the gains emerging from these
models occur from the liberalization of agriculture and textiles, and these are areas with (pre
Uruguay Round) high barriers in the industrial countries.  The argument is that most of the gains
from liberalization in these areas would likely accrue on the demand side, as demand elasticities
are lower than model supply elasticities because there are typically many alternative sources of
supply for these restricted products, and from economies in which factors are mobile across all
production sectors.
HRT show results which indicate that, under most  model specifications developing countries
lose from the elimination of the MFA15, a result they suggest is generated by the loss in transferred
quota rents to the exporting countries.  In contrast, FMN2 (1996a) (in Tables 9.10, 9.11 and
associated model results) show large and (except for non China transition economies) unambiguous
gains for all developing countries from MFA elimination. Indeed, the gains to China, Asia, and
South Asia are approximately 2% of GDP from this one source; they also show gains to Africa and
Latin America from MFA elimination. Beyond blockwide results, results by country have even wider
variance attached to them.  Table 3 highlights some of these; differences of a factor of 20 in certain
country results (Malaysia between HRT and HMYD), and differences in sign for Africa (FMN2
versus HRT and HMYD).
Results in Table 4 relate to the claim that the majority of the global gains from Uruguay
Round liberalization accrue to developed rather than developing countries, a feature that has been
claimed for these model results.16  Perroni (1998) in his survey of model results concludes, for
instance, that “the fraction of total gains accruing to developing countries is relatively small”.  HRT,
as noted earlier, make the same claim as common to their results, those of FMN, and HMYD.
Results in Table 4 suggest that these claims are only partly borne out by model results.  The
theme is strongly there in PNW and HRT; less strongly there in GM, and missing or reversed in
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HMYD and FMN2.  Indeed, in FMN2, as results proceed across model variants with higher aggregate
global gains (endogenous capital stock - fixed savings rate; endogenous capital stock - endogenous
savings rate) the proportion of gains accruing to the developing countries increases further.
Table 4
Developed and Developing Country Breakdown of Gains From The
Uruguay Round Decisions in Model Results
($bill, 1992 prices except where indicated)
Model Developed Country
Gains
Developing Country
Gains
Global Gains
FMN2 (IRS, fixed cap.
stock case)
40.1 59.3 99.4
HMYD 131.6 126.1 257.7
PNW (1986 prices) 50.6 19.3 69.9
HRT (IRS, non steady
state)
76.6 19.4 96.0
GM 178.6 56.5 235.1
Turning to other areas, only two of the models, BDFS and PNW, attempt quantification of
liberalization in services.  Both flag that their efforts are inevitably somewhat rudimentary, since
there is neither reliable information available for the representation of barriers to service trade, nor
analytical frameworks which fully capture the characteristics of individual service items (such as
banking, transportation and other policy forms of intermediation through time and space).  In
addition, data on service trade flows is notoriously poor.
BDKS assign tariff equivalents to service trade flows using Hoekman’s (1995) guesstimates
of service trade restrictiveness.  Hoekman classifies each of 155 service sectors and 4 modes of
supply for 97 countries using a subjective 3 way no restriction, some restriction, unbound
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classification.  BDKS assign tariff equivalents as prohibitive (200%) for a range of sectors (maritime
and air transport, life insurance, some telecommunications), and use ad valorem equivalents of 20-
50% for other sectors.  These are then multiplied by a restrictiveness index based on Hoekman’s
assignments.  PNW somewhat arbitrarily assign tariff equivalents to service flows treated as a single
category.
Table 5 reports the resulting model estimates of gains from services trade liberalization.
PNW’s results suggest that services liberalization will produce gains which are small compared to
total gains; while BDFS suggest that services account for the dominant portion of total gains from
the liberalization they consider.  Both groups of modelers are, however, careful to emphasize that
their results relate to potential gains from liberalization in services not actual gains.  They both
emphasize that the liberalization actually achieved in this sector in the Round was substantially more
limited that they model, but provide no guidance as to how to quantify actual as against potential
liberalization.
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Table 5
Estimates of the Gains from Services Liberalization related to and
beyond the Uruguay Round
BDFS (1996) Gains as % of Income
from
Services Liberalization Services Liberalization 
and
Industrial Products
US 0.7 0.9
Europe 0.6 0.9
Japan 0.8 1.4
Asian Newly Industrialized 1.1 3.6
Others 1.0 1.0
PNW (1995) Gain in 1986 Prices, $bill
Services Liberalization Services Liberalization,
Agriculture, Textiles & Tariffs
US 0.5 9.6
Europe 1.5 19.0
Japan 0.2 17.8
Rest of the World 0.1 2.7
World 5.9 69.9
The modellers all emphasize that their results only provide a partial picture of the
implications of the Uruguay Round decisions.  This is so for a number of reasons, including the
limited coverage of the various elements that make up the Uruguay Round decisions, as well as the
benchmark used for the evaluation of the agreement.  This is typically the status quo rather than a
threat point, such as that characterizing a further weakening of the trading system had the Uruguay
Round not concluded.
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17But see the recent paper by Watal (1999) which attempts to quantify the welfare
impactions for India of new disciplines under TRIPs.
On the coverage front, the major omissions are in the new issues areas of intellectual
property, and investment. Economywide models of impact of these factors are not well developed,
and data is a major problem.  In intellectual property, it is widely thought that potential losses to
developing countries will occur as they raise levels of protection and transfer resources to intellectual
property developers17; and in trade related investment measures new disciplines on domestic trade
related policy measures are thought to limit developing country policy flexibility, although if this
limits country abilities to impose trade restricting measures, some economists suggest this may yield
country gains.
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3. WHY DO THE DIFFERENCES IN RESULTS OCCUR?
The differences in model results at a detailed level noted above occur for a number of
reasons, although unearthing the single or dominant reason can be difficult, especially for non-
modellers.  First, there are differences in data, although for the key models in the set referred to
above, the extensive use of GTAP data would seem to minimize this source of discrepancy.  Second
come differences in key parameter values, and especially elasticity parameters.  Third come
differences in estimates of trade distortions, already highlighted above as a source of major
difference between earlier and later studies of the impact of the Round.  Finally come differences in
the theoretical structures used. One way to attempt a reconciliation of results would be for each
modeller/model to try to replicate the results of all other models by gradual replacement of others
data, parameters, distortion estimates, and structure, but the resource requirements of such an effort
across different software, code, and computer systems make this difficult.
The modelling group who have gone the farthest in attempting to reconcile various model
results are HRT (1998) who deserve substantial credit for their efforts.  Table 6 reports on their
suggested reconciliations.  However, while these are helpful and welcome efforts at reconciliation,
they are unfortunately still not comprehensive enough for the differences highlighted above to be
resolved in ways which would allow negotiators to use model results for the formulation of
negotiating positions.
Thus, for example, in agriculture HRT provide a helpful reconciliation of their results with
those of GM and others using the OECD RUNS model structure.  The issue they focus on is why GM
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18In private communication, Joseph Francois has suggested that the source of the
difference lies in FMN excluding agricultural tariff cuts from the modelled liberalization package
on the grounds that dirty tariffication in agriculture implied little liberalization from this source.
19In private communication, Joseph Francois has indicated that in his view the major
differences between FMN and HRT in this area lay in the modelling of imperfect competition,
rather than the explanation offered by HRT.
obtain somewhat larger impacts from agricultural reform than they do.  In agriculture, seemingly the
bigger issue is why FMN obtain such small numbers for agriculture.18
Table 6
Reconciliations among model results offered by HRT (1998)
1.  Overall evaluations of impact
Difference between HRT (1995, 1996, 1998) and FMN (1996a) in terms of dollar size of the
gain reflects the projection forward to 2005 in FMR (not made in HRT).  As a % of GWP, HRT claim
their results and FMR’s are comparable.  The differences between HRT and HYMD are attributed
again to projection forward to 2005.  They (HRT) rerun their model with factor endowments in the
model scaled in the same proportions as HMYD, and obtain a slightly lower estimate than HYMD,
which they attribute to elasticity differences.
2.  MFA reform
Claimed difference between HRT (1995, 1996, 1998), who show about 17% of the gains
coming from the UR, and FMN (1996a), who show about 50% of the gain coming from the UR, is
that HRT employ updated estimates of the tariff-equivalents of MFA quotas from the GTAP data
base, while FMN do not.19  HRT claim their estimates of gain are roughly comparable to those of
HYMD, who estimate about 20% of the gain from this source.
3.  Agriculture
HRT (1995, 1996, 1998) compare their model to GM (1995, 1996) and other models using
the so-called “RUNS” structure (models largely used at OECD).  These models show somewhat
larger gains from agricultural reform (some nearly 90% of total gains) than HRT (some 63% of total
gains).  Introducing the RUNS structure into the HRT model format increases the gains to 87% of
the total gain.
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20See HYMD, p. 195 and following.
In textiles and MFA reform, the difficulty with the HRT explanation is that while HRT and
FMN do use different estimates of tariff equivalents of MFA quotas (Table 3, p. 1413, HRT (1998);
Table 9.4, FMN (1996a), p. 263) from the published tabes FMN have significantly lower (rather than
higher) tariff equivalents for quotas.  From the size of the price distortion, one would expect
significantly larger not smaller impacts in HRT from MFA quota removal.  And FMN (1996a, p.
284) are both clear and explicit in indicating that they capture the removal of quota rents with MFA
elimination that HRT use to explain their result.  The losses from MFA removal are even more
pronounced in HYMD who show Asia, Latin America, and sub Saharan Africa all losing from MFA
removal (HYMD (1996) Table 7.9), in part because HYMD both point out and model MFA quotas
as growing in severity as they become more binding before being phased out in 2004. 20 
The HRT discussion of differences in total gains focuses on the role of extrapolations to
2005, as against the use of a 1992 base year calculation.  As noted earlier, this seems convincing, but
other model results without extrapolation, such as PNW, remain as having lower estimates.
Thus from the list of differences in model results from a developing country point of view,
the key ones noted above remain, although the issues at stake are narrowed by the HRT
reconciliations. Developing countries gain a large or small amount from the Round as the gains from
textiles and apparel liberalization are large or small (MFA), and agricultural liberalization yields
large or small effects.  Individual country or region gains or losses reflect the same factors.  The
ranking of  issues across models reflect similar considerations.  The issue of the size of gains from
services is not touched on by these reconciliations.
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At this point, the conclusion would seem to be that the HRT reconciliations are inconclusive
in both agriculture (FMN results not discussed), and textiles and apparel (explanation not fully
convincing).  On the other hand, one is tempted to argue that the weight of other modelling results
seem to side more heavily with HRT on these two central issues of agriculture and textiles and
apparel than they do with FMN.  As such, a working null hypothesis might be that the position that
developing countries gain a large amount from MFA removal, and that MFA removal yields
considerably larger aggregate gains then agricultural liberalization seems a minority modelling
position.
In the elasticity area their role in contributing to model result differences is also unclear.
HRT set out their elasticities, assuming all demand elasticities for goods aggregated across country
sources of supply are one; substitution elasticities between imports are everywhere and for all
products 8, and between domestic and imported goods everywhere and for products 4.  In their scale
economy variant; elasticities of substitution in preferences between varieties are 15.  The rationale
offered for using these estimates is “a priori beliefs about the plausible values of these elasticities”
(p.218). Elasticity values are not discussed in FMN2 (1996b), and in (1995) are given in a table in
an Appendix with “Armington” “substitution in value added” and “inverse scale” as the column
headers and various hard to read computer generated row headers with the reader left to infer that
these are presumably the same for all countries.  Armington elasticity values vary from 1.9 to 5.2
with literature sources only given for value added and scale elasticity values.  HMYD (1996)
seemingly provide no discussion of elasticities in their text (nor eve of model structure); HMYD
(1995) has a reference to an Appendix to the paper containing details on model parameters which
was not published, and a reference (p.82) to “elasticities of substitution twice as high as standard
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21These elasticities and discussion of their values has since been given in a CUP volume. 
I am grateful to Will Martin and Tom Hertel for bringing this to my attention.
GTAP elasticities were.....used in the projections and tariff liberalizations”, but with neither the
standard GTAP elasticities or the values used reported.21
Beyond the clarity of presentation of elasticity parameters in the model papers, the equally
central issue is what is their role in accounting for differences between model results.  HRT (1996)
report on systematic sensitivity analyses of their model results, which for space reasons, is somewhat
compact (HRT (1995) gives a fuller discussion).  Their conclusion is that “...to the extent that our
major conclusions are robust to perturbations (of plausible bounds on elasticities) we do not believe
that our uncertainty about specific values of these elasticities is a major weakness of the model”.
In contrast, Bach, Dimaranan, Hertel and Martin (forthcoming) in a piece building on HYMD
(1996) present results which they interpret as showing that the size of trade elasticities is the main
source of difference between their Uruguay Round results and those of others.  Their sense is that
trade elasticities should be larger than (perhaps double) those used in the earlier work, and this
modification will significantly increase estimates of gains.
FMN (1996a) offer no discussion of sensitivity analysis, but in their 1995 paper do report
cases where Armington trade parameters (effectively trade elasticities) are varied by plus and minus
25%, and scale parameters (in their scale economy variant) also vary by plus and minus 25%.  For
the former, (Table 18, Appendix) they show substantial variation in welfare affects across developing
countries (with some changes of sign), but small to little variation across developed countries.  The
reasons for this could lie in the differential size of impacts by region in their base case.  For the latter
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they show larger gains with seemingly smaller scale economy effects, which at first sight seems
counterintuitive.
It is also worth flagging that there are other issues of results sensitivity, beyond elasticities.
One is the choice of reference point.  All the model results take as their point of reference the status
quo that prevailed before the Uruguay Round in evaluating gains and losses, either in aggregate or
for particular regions or countries.  The issue from the point of view of quantifying gains and losses
from the Uruguay Round is that this ignores one of the major factors driving developing country
participation in the Round, namely the desire to strengthen the trading system.  If the developing
country concern in the 1980's was a spreading erosion in the basic principles of the trading system,
such as MFN, and the need to strengthen the application of these rules, results from models referred
to above based on the status quo may only shed limited light on the value of the Uruguay Round
decisions to them.  Crucial also here is the value of strengthened dispute settlement procedures to
the smaller countries.
A recent modelling piece by Ghosh, Perroni, and Whalley (1998) highlights the value to
smaller developing countries of preserving non-discrimination in trade rules.  They use a 7 region
global model benchmarked to 1986 data, and show that the gains from preserving non discrimination
substantially outweigh the gains from incremental trade liberalization such as occurred in the
Uruguay Round, and modelled in the pieces discussed above.  While the probability of these two
events (liberalization, and reversion to complete trade discrimination) are not equal, the possibility
that the value of system strengthening not covered by the available models might outweigh that of
conventional status quo evaluated liberalization (as in the Uruguay Round) seems worth further
consideration.
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In conclusion, the implications for the developing countries from all the model results would
thus seem to be that while there were probably global gains from the liberalization achieved in the
Uruguay Round, their precise dimensions are somewhat hazy, and the country (or region) and area
composition of these gains is equally cloudy.  Whether particular components, such as textiles or
agriculture were more important to them is unclear.  Why particular models produce results which
are higher or lower than others is also still not clear, and modellers sometimes have competing
theories to explain differences in results.  How far negotiators should either accept or act on any one
set of model results is also not clear
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22See an earlier version of this same argument I made in Whalley (1986); but see the
counter argument presented in Kehoe et al (1995) which uses a model of Spain to analyze VAT
changes and argues that model predictions conform with real world behaviour.
4. EXPOST VALIDATION OF MODEL RESULTS
In thinking through the differences in Uruguay Round model results highlighted in the
previous section, a natural question to ask is whether it is possible to use expost validation of these
model results as a way of distinguishing between them.  The argument is that the Round concluded
in 1994, and data on how the global economy has performed since then is now available and should
surely be able to be utilized to evaluate whether the predictions of impacts made by the models have
turned out to be correct. 
While seemingly a natural approach to take to model validation, my view is that expost
validation is virtually unimplementable in the case of the Uruguay Round models, and that this is
so for a variety of reasons.  In my opinion, these results, as for other general equilibrium and
simulation model predictions, are inherently untestable.22 The first reason for this is that the
liberalization seemingly assumed in the model experiments discussed here (see Francois (1999)), and
largely based on the final Uruguay Round text, remains still not fully implemented some five years
later.  Liberalization in textiles and agriculture has yet to arrive in any substantive way, and available
trade data certainly do not reflect the impacts of the full liberalization agreed to in the Round.  The
liberalization experiments in the models and the liberalization generating the data are different.
The second is that, even were the announced liberalization now complete, many other things
have happened in the world economy since 1994, and these as well as the decisions of the Uruguay
Round affect the data generated since.  These effects include real growth at different rates by country
(and underlying productivity growth), changes in transportation costs between economies, shifts in
32
preferences for goods both within and across countries, changes in market structure, changes in
commodity prices (including oil), and many other factors.  Despite the efforts made in 1994 to
convince (the then GATT) contracting parties of the benefits of concluding the Uruguay Round, the
likelihood is that all these other factors have had more influence on trade patterns and global
economic performance since than the decisions of the Round themselves.
A third reason is that the key results from the models, namely estimates of gain and loss both
globally and by country (or region) refer to variables which are inherently unmeasurable.  Economic
welfare is a concept that relates to levels of consumer satisfaction (or happiness) from the
consumption of bundles of commodities.  Changes in economic welfare attributed to the Uruguay
Round decisions relate to measures of utility, converted into what economists label a money metric
measure of the welfare change.  This refers to the monetary equivalent of the change in consumer
satisfaction due to the increased trade and consumption stemming from the decisions agreed to in
the Round. Available data measures the value of trade, production, consumption, and employment
by commodity or sector.  Such data are available by region, and on a pre and post Round basis.
These data, however, yield no direct measure of the monetary equivalent of a welfare change.  To
do this functional forms for preferences must be assumed, parameter values determined in some way
(by calibration or estimation).  Even given observed data, money measures of welfare changes
remain parameter sensitive (to elasticities, for instance).
Separating out the influences of the decisions of the Round on available data from these other
factors is thus no easy matter.  What is needed is decompositional analysis of a total change that has
occurred, into constituent parts.  This contrasts with the model work on the Uruguay Round, which
is inherently counterfactual in nature; i.e. analysis of the future potential impacts of a change which
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is yet to occur.  The modelling literature is only recently turning itself to the development of
procedures for decompositional analysis (see Abrego and Whalley (1999)), and these techniques
were not available at the time these exercises were undertaken.  Such analyses are also complicated
by many factors, including the non additive nature of the components to be analyzed; and the
sensitivity of decompositions to key model parameters, such as elasticities. Put another way, if told
that exante models predicted welfare gains globally of $500 billion from the Uruguay Round, and
if asked where these gains are in the data, the honest response is to say that welfare is not directly
measured and such a predicted gain cannot be either verified or disproven by data.
Despite these difficulties, I have taken projected changes in world trade from model results
in Table 7 and compared these to actual trade changes.  Somewhat surprisingly, only three of the
models appear to report projected impacts on world trade, and among the three there is again
substantial variance in model estimates.  HMYD report the largest estimate of nearly 60%; the lowest
estimate in FMD2 is around 6%. None of the estimates have any time frame attached to them; the
period of adjustment to the new trade regime is unspecified, as is the period over which trade growth
is to occur. This makes any comparison between predicted and actual trade changes difficult if not
impossible.
Table 7 indicates an actual change in world trade between 1994 and 1997 in volume terms
of 20%.  This figure, however, needs to be qualified by the observations that with a 10 year phase
in for major decisions from the Round, actual growth will be considerably larger; and that little
substantive liberalization occurred in key areas covered by the Round between 1994 and 1997 
Table 7
Comparison of Model Projections of Changes in
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20WTO Annual Report 1998, International Trade Statistics, Table 11.1, p.11.
World Trade Volumes and Actual Changes
Model Projected Changes
in World Trade Volumes
Due to the Uruguay Round
Actual Changes in
World Trade Volumes
1994-1997
NPW (1993) 20.2%
FMN2 (1995) 5.7-14.5% 20%20
HMYD (1995) 58.8%
GM (1996) n.a.
HRT (1996) n.a.
(textiles, for instance), and so the elements of decisions driving actual trade growth for this period
remain largely non implemented.
In closing this section, I should perhaps highlight again that for non modelers seeking to use
these model results to inform their future WTO negotiating positions what I set out here must seem
a perplexing state of affairs; seemingly non verifiable results with sharp differences across them, and
with degrees of inconsistency that seemingly grow with higher levels of disaggregation. The
comment I would offer is that judging model results against an absolute standard of performance and
consistency generates an unattainable, unrealistic, and perhaps ultimately unhelpful standard. If
model results could be reconciled, and users had more confidence in the logic driving individual
results, then their fresh insights on previously unexplored issues would provide food for thought.
Relative to the next best alternative of pure conjecture they are an improvement. The key is to
understand their behaviour, and hence the importance of a comprehensive model comparisons
exercise to move clearly localize the sources of result differences.
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The other issue that also needs to be faced is that in the policy process model results are often
not used in the same way as in the research community.  Because the roles played by model structure,
parameters and other factors are less well understood, and because the modelling process may seem
non-transparent, numerical results can either be seized on as ammunition supporting a prior position
or castigated as worthless, frequently with little concrete underpinning the allegation.  The balanced
position in my view is that if results are used as a selective guide to intuition and the source of null
hypotheses to challenge models are simultaneously unreliable, inconsistent, and highly informative.
In the present case, the inconsistencies across model results, in my view, unfortunately compromise
both their receptivity and the process of sensibly using their results; and differences in model results
are in need of resolution.
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5. MODELLING AND THE MILLENNIUM ROUND
Given this evaluation of the model results from the Uruguay Round, what should be the
approach adopted towards any modelling work used in a future WTO Round?  Should existing
models be rejected on the grounds their results are unreliable, or is there some other way forward?
From my remarks at the end of the previous section, it should be clear that my own position is that
model analyses for a future Round should definitely not be rejected; but at the same time we need
to improve upon what we now have.
At the end of the Round, with little understanding of how numbers were generated a large
estimate of global gains was used to persuade contracting parties to conclude the Round.  Many of
the participants in the negotiations lacked an appreciation of what these gains were, or how these
estimates had been arrived at.  Modelers, the WTO Secretariat, the World Bank and other agencies
in which the studies had been conducted made significant efforts to help with understanding; but the
gap was large and expectations were built up as to what the eventual impacts might be.  Five years
on, the question posed (and to some delegations quite naturally so) is where are the $500 billion of
gains; and for individual countries what has happened to their share?  This sense of unfulfilled
promise fuelled by expectations stemming, in part, from model results was one factor behind the
cautious approach to a new Round by the developing countries in Seattle.
For a new Round, in my view, the first step towards constructive use of modelling work is
a clear acknowledgment on all sides of the communication difficulties of the past.  Receivers of
model results need to be much more aware of how results are generated, what the key assumptions
are, what the key parameters are, and what the margins of error are.  Producers of model results need
to be able to better communicate, and, especially, to mutually reconcile both their results and their
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model structures and parameter values used.  This ideally should not be left as a task for researchers
such as myself, not directly involved in the immediate modelling work, who some five years on find
myself going through tables in published papers which sometimes report only part of results, not
always on consistent bases, and with at times incomplete parameter descriptions. An explicit model
comparisons exercise in which models and results were achieved and differences across models
explored would help greatly.  It would also help to build up wider trust in the worth of the modelling
exercises.
Reconciliation of model results needs to be an ongoing task, with such a model comparisons
forum convened at the start of any new Round.  Weaknesses in both data and key parameter
estimates need to be centrally acknowledged, and improvements sought.  The ways in which
different model structures can influence results needs to be systematically studied.  Modelers also
need to accept that at the end of the day their numbers, even if, at times, inevitably produced using
assumptions and approximations, carry substantial potential weight in the policy process and they
need to explain, communicate, and reconcile.
Let me also add that at the time of writing, a new Round if it ever emerges is yet to be
concretely defined, but is beginning to emerge as a more narrowly targeted Round than the Uruguay
Round; focussed on agriculture, services, and industrial tariffs; and with a much shorter time frame
(3 years).  If this is the case the time for developing new models may be short.   In already evaluating
these areas the Uruguay Round models already contain the right ingredients.  Agriculture and
industrial tariffs are already fully modelled (even if results are not consistent), and attempts have
been made to model services.  Better data on services, and work on alternative analytic structures
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for services may be needed, but the dovetailing between current model coverage and issues for the
Millennium Round could hardly be better.
What is needed, as I have emphasized above, is to reconcile existing model results, agree the
weaknesses in key parameter estimates, data, and model structures, and use the resulting reconciled
structures to better inform the policy process, and through this the developing countries as to their
negotiating positions in the Millennium Round.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper discusses model based evaluations of the impact of the Uruguay Round
undertaken both in the later stages of the Round, and in the Round’s immediate aftermath. It focuses
on the oft cited estimates of global gains of $500 billion annually, and associated impacts by country,
region, and for individual components of the Uruguay Round package.  It asks how reliable these
estimates are, and what the implications are both for the developing countries and for a new Round.
The picture that emerges is one of inconsistency across model results, even where seemingly
similar base data is used.  These inconsistencies seem to be a problem that intensifies as more
disaggregated results are examined.  The early estimates of global gains of $500 billion fall
substantially in later models; estimates of gain and loss by region vary substantially; the estimates
of the relative importance of various components of the Uruguay Round package (tariffs, agriculture,
textiles) also vary substantially.
This may seem a perplexing state of affairs to non-modelers, but with uncertain values for
key parameters, differences in model structure, variations in the way experiments are set up, and
other factors, such differences inevitably arise.  An absolute standard of performance clearly casts
doubt on these model results taken as combined set; a standard of the next best alternative is more
sympathetic.  Explicit model comparisons and reconciliations of results are what is needed to better
understand them, and build confidence in their future use.
For a new Round, I suggest that despite these discrepancies in results the Uruguay Round
models could not be better suited to the task if, as expected, it is a time limited Round and one
focussed on agriculture, tariffs, and services.  Two of these areas provide the core of the existing
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Uruguay Round models, and a start has been made on services.  Where work is needed in better
reconciling the results from existing models, and in sorting out why results seem to differ so much.
Developing countries have clear interests in agriculture in a new Round, and the size of
potential gains and the segments to focus on can be informed by these models.  Developing countries
have the higher tariffs, and the adjustment and other implications of a further multilateral reduction
can be usefully analyzed.  Services is an area where many remain confused exactly what is in their
national interest, and models can help here.  The key is communication, transparency, better
understanding, and ultimately improved confidence in their usefulness.  The step needed is a more
comprehensive model comparisons exercise than undertaken thus far.  
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